The B-2 "Sprint" Bomber

The B-2 Spirit is a multi-role bomber capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions. Along with the B-52 and B-1B, the B-2 provides the penetrating flexibility and effectiveness inherent in manned bombers. Its low-observable, or "stealth," characteristics give it the unique ability to penetrate an enemy's most sophisticated defenses and threaten its most valued, and heavily defended, targets. Its capability to penetrate air defenses and threaten effective retaliation provide an effective deterrent and combat force well into the 21st century.

The blending of low-observable technologies with high aerodynamic efficiency and large payload gives the B-2 important advantages over existing bombers. Its low-observability provides it greater freedom of action at high altitudes, thus increasing its range and a better field of view for the aircraft's sensors.

Four General Electric F118-GE-100 non-afterburning turbofan engines (each delivering approximately 19,000 lbs. of thrust) drive the airplane to a maximum speed described as "high subsonic," and to altitudes near 50,000 ft. They also provide an unrefueled range of approximately 6,000 nautical miles. A single aerial refueling extends this to some 10,000 miles and multiple visits to air tankers stretches the range indefinitely.

The B-2's low observability is derived from a combination of reduced infrared, acoustic, electromagnetic, visual and radar signatures. These signatures make it difficult for the sophisticated defensive systems to detect, track and engage the B-2. Many aspects of the low-observability process remain classified; however, the B-2's composite materials, special coatings and flying-wing design all contribute to its "stealthiness."

The B-2 has a crew of two pilots, an aircraft commander in the left seat and mission commander in the right, compared to the B-1B's crew of four and the B-52's crew of five.

The B-2 is intended to deliver gravity nuclear and conventional weapons, including precision-guided standoff weapons. An interim, precision-guided bomb capability called Global Positioning System (GPS) Aided Targeting System/GPS Aided Munition (GATS/GAM) is being tested and evaluated. Initially the bomber’s principal weapon is the 2,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM, GBU-31). The basic aircraft continues to undergo multiple modifications, some of which are aimed at correcting deficiencies in the original aircraft design, while others are intended to enhance capability and improve the aircraft’s operational effectiveness and suitability. Planned modifications for FY04 and beyond include addition of an extremely high frequency satellite communication system, upgrades to the DMS, advances in LO materials, Link-16 integration, weapon integration, and periodic software upgrades. Weapons being added include the Enhanced GBU-28 (EGBU-28), the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), and the 500-pound JDAM (GBU-38).

The B-2 radar requires an upgrade called the Radar Modernization Program (RMP) to move the radar to a new operating frequency. This upgrade is necessitated to avoid interference with primary authorized users of the current B-2 radar frequency. The RMP will feature an active electronically scanned array and is scheduled to undergo IOT&E in FY07. The B-2 was employed in combat operations during Operation Allied Force (March through May 1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2001), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (March through April 2003).

B-2s, in a conventional role, staging from Whiteman AFB, MO; Diego Garcia; and Guam can cover the entire world with just one refueling. Six B-2s could execute an operation similar to the 1986 Libya raid but launch from the continental U.S. rather than Europe with a much smaller, more lethal, and more survivable force. Using the rotary launcher assembly, all B-2s are capable of employing 16 Mk 84 JDAMs, 16 JSOWs, or 8 GBU-37/BLU-113s (to be replaced by EGBU-28).

Modifications currently under way will allow each B-2 to carry 80 500-pound GBU-38 JDAMs. The B-2 can also carry eight of the massive 5,000-pound GBU-37 bunker-buster bombs, and may eventually carry a pair of the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrators. Proponents claim that by 2007 the B-2 could carry 216 [some accounts say as many as 324] of the 250-pound SDBs. Each BRU-61/A smart pneumatic carriage holds four SDB weapons, the rack weighs 320 pounds (145 kg) empty, and 1,460 pounds (664 kg) loaded with four 285 pound (130 kg) bombs. In principle, the B-2 has a total of 80 attach points for the 500-lb MK82 GBU-30 JDAM, each of which could accommodate a single BRU-61/A rack, for a total of 320 SDB weapons. In practice, the resulting 117,000 lbs (53,000 kg) weight would exceed the B-2's nominal 40,000 pound (18,000 kilogram) payload by some wide margin. The bomber could of course trade up for somewhat more payload by trading off against fuel and un-refueled range. The widely cited 216 SDB carriage would result in 54 BRU-61/A racks, 27 in each bomb bay, for a total 78,800 pound (35,800 kilogram) payload, roughly double the nominal value.

B-2 History

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The B-2 development program was initiated in 1981, and the Air Force was granted approval in 1987 to begin procurement of 132 operational B-2 aircraft, principally for strategic bombing missions. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the emphasis of B-2 development was changed to conventional operations and the number was reduced to 20 operational aircraft, plus 1 test aircraft that was not planned to be upgraded to an operational configuration. Production of these aircraft was concurrent with development and testing.

Although the B-2’s flying wing outline seems unusual today, aeronautical engineers have long known about the advantages of the basic design. As far back as World War I, all-wing airplanes were highly regarded as being stable and forgiving in the air—too stable, as it turned out, to make a good warplane. But engineers like John Northrop knew that such a design, not needing a conventional fuselage and tail assembly, would produce much less drag as it moved through the air. The air resistance thus saved could in turn be traded for significant advantages: higher speed, or the ability to carry a greater load at much greater ranges. There were other benefits as well. With no need to confine most of the payload within a narrow and heavily-stressed fuselage, that weight can be evenly distributed across most of the lifting surface, resulting in a lighter and more efficient structure. Northrop devoted much of his career to proving that the all-wing concept could be used in a practical aircraft.

The Northrop Aircraft Company’s XB-35 Flying Wing bomber, powered by four Pratt and Whitney Wasp reciprocating engines driving eight contra-rotating propellers, made its first appearance in 1946. Plagued with engine and gearbox problems, the design was adapted for jet power and the eight-jet YB-49 took to the air on Oct. 21, 1947. In the months that followed, a strange anomaly was noticed as the big plane flew about the country: it was often hard to see in the air, and under some conditions it nearly disappeared from the radar screens of the day. For a number of reasons, the YB-49 never went into production. Too advanced to be effectively maneuvered by the control systems of their day, the giant wings nevertheless went a long way toward validating Jack Northrop’s faith in the basic design. Other planes were selected for operational use by the Air Force, however, and the flying wing concept was relegated to the future.

Designing a new warplane became far more than a matter of developing a new and improved airframe. The systems approach meant that new weapons suites and swiftly-evolving electronic capabilities had to be blended into an integrated design in order to end up with an airplane capable of doing numerous complex tasks well. The use of lightweight composite materials was also becoming common, and new electronic flight controls meant that long-known aerodynamic concepts were on the verge of becoming practical.

By the 1970s, yet another factor was coming into play: stealth technology. This promised to make an airplane hard for an enemy to detect, and even harder to attack. The new airplane, soon to become known as the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) would have to cope with an exacting set of requirements in order to survive in future combat scenarios. Along with its radar-deflecting shape, it would have to have a low infrared signature in order to evade heat-seeking missiles, and to carry a sophisticated electronic suite. It should resist detection by visual and acoustical means as well as by enemy radar. With massed bomber attacks a thing of the past, the ATB would have to be capable of carrying out its mission alone and without fighter escort: one airplane, carrying out precision attacks, in the absence of many.

And, of course, the new design would also have to be aerodynamically efficient in order to carry a meaningful payload over intercontinental ranges. With all of these demanding constraints in mind, it was perhaps inevitable that Northrop designers would call to mind the sleek all-wing monsters of the past.

The sophistication of the electronic flight control system, mated to the excellent flight dynamics of the basic airframe, result in an airplane which is especially easy to fly. Most pilots say that you cannot tell you are in a flying wing—there’s no sensation of the unusual, and you forget that you are in a short-coupled aircraft with no tail. One pilot describes it as a "real feet-on-the-floor airplane," with controls so well harmonized that there is no need for continual rudder inputs during in-flight maneuvers. According to one pilot, "You put the nose right where you want it, and it stays there—there’s no hunting, or oscillating, or overshooting like when you are refueling a B-52. You don’t have to fight with this plane."

More is involved here than just pilot convenience. A pilot who is struggling to anticipate what his plane will do, and to take corrective action before it responds, has little enough attention left over for emergencies, or for mission requirements. Bombers, by definition, fly very long missions and potential combat scenarios already project B-2 missions of up to 36 hours duration. That’s asking a lot from only two pilots. Another pilot maintains that the B-2 flies much like the C-141. "You know that you are in a heavy aircraft, but it is responsive. It has a real good roll rate, but of course you aren’t allowed to try the maneuvers that a fighter can," he said.

The flying wing reserves its most startling effect for when it is landing. As soon as that huge wing area snuggles down into ground effect, it wants to float along a cushion of air. "Your first couple of landings are always a thousand feet or so too long. You have to nudge the stick a little to make it settle. It’s almost a ‘push to flare’ airplane. But its easy—the only plane easier to land is the F-15." People who fly the jet give most of the credit to the flight control system.

Fly-by-wire means that you are flying the computers (four of them, in this case), not the control surfaces themselves. Quadruple redundancy means that, in effect, the four computers "vote" on the result of any given control input by the pilot—at least three must agree, and any anomaly is automatically thrown out. The beauty of a system like this is that all sorts of conditions and compensations can be programmed in. For example, the B-2’s bomb doors set up a huge amount of drag when they are opened. When a heavy bomb load is dropped, the plane will want to jump, yet the flight controls automatically compensate for both of these effects, and the pilot has only to operate the throttle. Similarly, the high-tech automatic pilot is theoretically capable of flying an entire mission profile, from takeoff to landing, with the pilot only providing the necessary power settings.

The first B-2 was publicly displayed on 22 November 1988, when it was rolled out of its hangar at Air Force Plant 42, Palmdale, CA. The heavy force-projection aircraft was designed from the outset to be hard for an enemy to detect. Its smooth and rounded surfaces contrasted strongly with Lockheed’s angular F-117, whose first photo had been released to the public only 12 days earlier. The bomber’s design, in fact, demonstrated an advanced approach to low-observable technology.

A Northrop electrical engineer named Fred Oshira had first developed a "Source Distribution Technique" to predict the radar cross-sections of complex three-dimensional surfaces in 1963. It took a number of years to translate the new principle into the computer programs which could fully utilize them, but the result was an entirely new method for working with complicated curved surfaces. The electronic data base not only replaced conventional two-dimensional drawings, but could be encrypted and conveniently accessed by design teams at far-flung locations. Thus, engineers at Boeing in Seattle, Washington and LTV in Dallas, Texas, could easily work together to design the B-2’s revolutionary airframe. The database also permitted engineering changes to be incorporated much faster, and, as a bonus, the precise geometry and parts measurements also allowed production tooling and inventory to be developed faster and with greater accuracy.

Not only was the bomber’s basic shape inherently stealthy, but its smooth lifting surfaces had an excellent lift factor. Its lift-over-drag ratio, which approached that of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, could be translated into efficient long-range operation. A quadruple-redundant fly-by-wire flight control layout was teamed with a sophisticated air data system to eliminate the stability and control problems which plagued the large flying wings of the past.

Flight controls located on the trailing edge duplicated the functions of ailerons, elevators and rudders on conventional aircraft. Flaps on the wing tips were designed to open like dive brakes whenever the pilot inputs a course change, causing the big jet to pivot and change direction as needed. A "beaver tail" flap provided trim for the pitch axis and helped alleviate wind gust effects.

Its first flight was July 17, 1989. The B-2 Combined Test Force, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., was responsible for flight testing the engineering, manufacturing and development aircraft as they were produced. Three of the six developmental aircraft delivered at Edwards continued flight testing.

Whiteman AFB, MO, is the B-2's only operational base. The first aircraft, Spirit of Missouri, was delivered Dec. 17, 1993. Depot maintenance responsibility for the B-2 is performed by Air Force contractor support and is managed at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center at Tinker AFB, OK.

The Air Force began full-scale development of the B-2 bomber in 1981 and planned to acquire 132 operational bombers. The estimated cost to acquire and construct facilities for 132 aircraft, expressed in then-year dollars, increased by $19 billion, from $58.2 billion in 1986, when B-2 cost estimates were first made public, to $77 billion in 1990, representing a cost increase of 32 percent. The estimated cost calculated in constant 1992 dollars grew from $60.2 billion to $74.3 billion, an increase of 23 percent. The Air Force was granted approval in 1987 to begin procurement of 132 operational B-2 aircraft, principally for strategic bombing missions.

In April 1990, the Secretary of Defense, as the result of a major aircraft review, announced a reduction in the B-2 quantities, from 132 to 76. As a result, in January 1991, the Air Force estimated the cost to develop, procure, and construct facilities for 76 aircraft at $648 billion in then-year dollars.

In January 1992, the President reduced B-2 quantities from 75 to 20 operational aircraft, plus 1 test aircraft that was not planned to be upgraded to an operational configuration. The Air Force estimated the cost of the 20 aircraft program, including construction of facilities, at $45.3 billion in then-year dollars. Production of these aircraft was concurrent with development and testing With the demise of the Soviet Union, the emphasis of B-2 development was changed to conventional operations.

The prime contractor, responsible for overall system design and integration, is Northrop Grumman's Military Aircraft Systems Division. Boeing Military Airplanes Co., Hughes Radar Systems Group and General Electric Aircraft Engine Group are key members of the aircraft contractor team. Another major contractor, responsible for aircrew training devices (weapon system trainer and mission trainer) is Hughes Training Inc. (HTI) - Link Division, formerly known as C.A.E. - Link Flight Simulation Corp. Northrop Grumman and its major subcontractor HTI, are responsible for developing and integrating all aircrew and maintenance training programs.

On 21 March 1996 President Bill Clinton directed that the remaining B-2 Spirit test flight aircraft be upgraded to a fully operational aircraft using funds from a Congressional addition to the FY96 defense budget for the multi-role bomber, DoD announced today. The B-2 upgrade is expected to cost about $493 million and will increase the B-2 inventory to 21 aircraft. This upgrade was contingent upon Air Force negotiations of a mutually agreeable firm-fixed price contract with Northrop Grumman. The upgrade includes replacing the landing gear, a new avionics suite, and modifications to the aircraft structure, fuel system, and weapons bay doors. It would be primarily accomplished at the Northrop Palmdale facility and was estimated to take about three years. The total R&D and procurement for the B-2 program in then-year dollars is $44.4 billion.

In the early 1990s the Northrop workforce peaked at 13,000, though by early 2001 only 1,200 employees worked on the B-2 in Palmdale, doing maintenance and upgrades. Northrop has estimated that it would cost between $2 billion and $4 billion to reopen the production line, including nonrecurring costs. Each new aircraft would cost about $500-700 million for a production run of 40 aircraft. In the late 1990s both Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney were among those publicly supporting production of more B-2s. During the 2000 presidential campaign some Bush advisors suggested considering resumption of B-2 production.

In 2001 Northrop Grumman Corporation offered to build 40 more aircraft at a cost of $735 million apiece, a reduction from the $2.2-billion unit cost of the existing fleet.

Each stealth bomber has at least three designations. The Air Vehicle [AV] number [eg, AV-1], indicative of the aircraft's construction sequence within the stealth bomber program. The tail number [eg 82-1066] is part of the general Air Force numbering system in which the first two digits are the year in which the plane was authorized, and the last four digits are the aircraft's unique serial number. The planes also have both formal and informal names, which is an unusual [though increasingly common] practice. For a long time we had a bit of difficulty providing robust correlation among these three designation systems, since Whiteman AFB and Dave Hastings did't have their stories straight on Spirit of OHIO and Spirit of ARIZONA. While we think that we have finally gotten these ducks lined up, any additional corrections would be vastly appreciated.

Following the naval precedent in which battleships, and subsequently whatever ship the Navy regarded as its capital ship [currently ballistic missile submarines, but it was nuclear powered cruisers for a while] were named after states, operational B-2 aircraft are named after states, with the annoying exception of Spirit of KITTY HAWK. States so honored are generally those with a close association [operational, political, or otherwise] with the program. This would seem to place an upper limit of 50 on the number of aircraft that can eventually be expected to be produced, though one imagines that additional states can be admitted to the Union if the need arises.

Test aircraft have a somewhat less illustrious, and less definitive, naming system. Sources vary as to the names that have at times been used in connection with these airfraft, and we provide all names that have been reportedly associated with these vehicles [with the less certain names in [] parentheses]. As they enter operational service, these aircraft were given more dignified state names.

The Air Force accepted delivery of production B-2s in three configuration blocks--blocks 10, 20, and 30. Initial delivery was 6 test aircraft, 10 aircraft in the block 10 configuration, 3 in the block 20 configuration, and 2 in the block 30 configuration.

Block 10 configured aircraft provide limited combat capability with no capability to launch conventional guided weapons. The Block 10 model carries only Mk-84 2,000-pound conventional bombs or gravity nuclear weapons. The first operational version of the Spirit, called Block 10, began to be delivered to Whiteman AFB in December, 1993, and continued to April 1996. B-2s in this configuration were located at Whiteman Air Force Base and were used primarily for training. As with most new warplanes, these had only limited initial capabilities with refinements to be added as the system matured. Block 10 planes initially were capable of carrying only general purpose (Mk-84) 2,000 LB bombs or gravity-delivered nuclear weapons to "soft" targets from medium or high altitudes. This sufficed for the initial deployment, but the planes were later returned to Palmdale for upgrading to Block 20 or Block 30 status.

Block 20 configured aircraft have an interim capability to launch nuclear and conventional munitions, including the GAM guided munition. The Block 20 has been tested with the Mk-84, 2,000-pound, general-purpose bombs and the CBU-87/B Combined Effects Munition cluster bombs (low-altitude, full-bay release). Block 20 aircraft, produced between April and December 1996, provided greater electronic and weapon-delivery abilities. A Terrain Avoidance/Terrain Following (TA/TF) capability provided for low-profile missions. Block 20 also included an interim precision-guided bomb system based on the use of the Global Positioning System (GATS/GAM).

Block 30 configured aircraft are fully capable and meet the essential employment capabilities defined by the Air Force. The first fully configured Block 30 aircraft, AV-20 Spirit of PENNSYLVANIA, was delivered to the Air Force on 07 August 1997. Compared to the Block 20, the Block 30s have almost double the radar modes along with enhanced terrain-following capability and the ability to deliver additional weapons, including the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the Joint Stand Off Weapon. Other features include incorporation of configuration changes needed to make B-2s conform to the approved radar signature; replacement of the aft decks; installation of remaining defensive avionics functions; and installation of a contrail management system.

All block 10, 20, and test aircraft were eventually modified to the objective block 30 configuration. This modification process began in July 1995 and was completed in June 2000. The Spirit of Missouri was the first Block 10 B-2 delivered to the Air Force. It arrived at Whiteman on 17 December 1993, the 90th anniversary of flight and the 49th anniversary of the 509th Bomb Wing. The Spirit of Missouri departed Whiteman 09 November 1995 and returned to the Northrop Grumman Plant 42 assembly line where it underwent the two-year modification process to upgrade it to its final Block 30 configuration. In January 1998 the upgraded aircraft joined the fleet of Whiteman's newest squadron, the 325th Bomb Squadron.

The Spirit of Indiana, a Block-30 aircraft, was the 20th of 21 B-2s to be named. The Spirit of Indiana arrived at Whiteman in May 1999, bringing the total number of B-2s on station to 10. The B-2 fleet had 16 combat-coded aircraft by the second quarter of FY00. Whiteman welcomed home the final B-2 when Spirit of America rolled to a stop in front of base operations 14 July 2000. More than 150 members of the Whiteman community braved 100-degree temperatures to roll out the red carpet for the 21st member of the B-2 fleet. Spirit of America was flown home by Col. Tony Przybyslawski, 509th Bomb Wing commander, and Maj. Bob Duncan, 325th Bomb Squadron assistant director of operations.

The B-2 Bomber required low-level, terrain following performance. The B-2 includes a very complex Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) system that integrates the forward looking radar subsystem, flight control computers, navigational computers and cockpit displays. Before low-level flight testing could begin, the airworthiness of the system had to be reviewed and certified safe for flight. An Executive Independent Review Team (EIRT) was established to review the B-2 TF/TA system. The review team was made up of EN and Air Force Research Laboratory experts. EIRT engineers conducted a thorough review of the TF/TA system, primarily to make the system fail-safes more robust. The EIRT engineers also provided valuable lessons learned from previous aircraft systems such as the B-1, F-16 and F-111. The B-2 Program Office engineers, working with the contractor, implemented many of the EIRT recommendations. The organic engineering expertise of the EN EIRT and ASC Engineering Program Office engineers, along with the contractor team, combined to create a TF/TA system for the B-2 which has proven safe in both flight test and operational use.

Link-16 – Providing Line-of-Sight (LOS) data for aircraft-to-aircraft, aircraft-to-C2, and aircraft-to-sensor connectivity, Link-16 is a combat force multiplier that provides U.S. and other allied military services with fully interoperable capabilities and greatly enhances tactical Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence mission effectiveness. Link-16 provides increased survivability, develops a real-time picture of the theater battlespace, and enables the aircraft to quickly share information on short notice (target changes).

Connectivity – DoD requires survivable communications media for command and control of nuclear forces. To satisfy the requirement, the Air Force plans to deploy an advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) satellite communications constellation. This constellation will provide a survivable, high capability communication system. Based on favorable results from a funded risk reduction study, the B-2 will integrate an EHF communication capability satisfying connectivity requirements.

Digital Engine Controller - The current analog engine controllers are high failure items, and without funding, ACC will be forced to ground aircraft beginning approximately FY08. Replacement of the engine controllers will improve the B-2’s performance and increase supportability, reliability, and maintainability. Computers/Processors - With advances in computer technology and increased demands on the system, the B-2’s computers will need to be replaced with state-of-the-art processors. Although reliable, maintaining the present processors will become increasingly difficult and costly.

Signature Improvements - The B-2’s signature meets operational requirements against today’s threats. As advanced threats proliferate, it will be prudent to investigate advanced signature reduction concepts and determine if it is necessary to improve the B-2’s low observable signature.

Tactical delivery tactics use patterns and techniques that minimize final flight path predictability, yet allows sufficient time for accurate weapons delivery. For conventional munitions. Bomb Rack Assembly (BRA) weapons delivery accuracies depend on delivery altitude. For a weapons pass made at 5,000 ft above ground level [AGL] or below, the hit criteria is less than or equal to 300 feet. For a weapons pass made above 5,000 feet AGL, the hit criteria is less than or equal to 500 feet. Similarly, Rotary Launcher Assembly (RLA) delivery of conventional or nuclear weapons (i.e. Mk-84, B-83, B-61) is altitude dependent. For a weapons pass made at 5,000 feet AGL or below, the hit criteria is less than or equal to 300 feet. For a weapons pass made above 5,000 ft AGL, the hit criteria is less than or equal to 500 feet. The hit criteria for a weapons pass made with GAM/ JDAM munitions is less than or equal to 50 feet.

The Air Force is modifying the fleet of B-2 stealth bombers to carry new 500-pound satellite-guided GBU-30 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs as soon as February 2003. The B-2 can carry 16 of the 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs but could carry as many as 80 of the 500-pounders.

In March 2002 it was reported that the Air Force had discovered cracks on the rear sections of 16 of the 21 B-2 stealth bombers. The cracks ranged in length from less than an inch to nine inches. They are all on titanium plates behind the jets' engine exhausts. The Air Force determined that the cracks did not pose an immediate danger to the B-2's, though maintenance crews were required to measure each of the cracks after every flight to see if they were growing.

The first of a series of planned upgrades to the B-2 Spirit Bomber entered flight test in FY03. This bundled package of capability includes the upgraded, or “Smart” Bomb Rack Assembly; ability to drop the 500 lb Joint Direct Attack Munition Mark 82; ability to drop the Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit-28 (EGBU-28) bunker buster; and addition of improved voice and data communication via integration of a programmable UHF satellite communication terminal. Incorporation of this upgraded package into the fleet began in FY04.

The basis for the useful life of the B-2 includes data from initial Developmental Test and Evaluation analysis. Data indicates the aircraft should be structurally sound to approximately 40,000 flight hours using current mission profiles. Analysis further suggests that the rudder attachment points are the first structural failure item. The B-2 has not implemented an ASIP similar to the other bombers, and this makes it difficult to predict the economic service life and attrition rate. However, a notional projection, based on the B-52, predicts one aircraft will be lost each 10 years. This attrition rate, plus attrition due to service life, will erode the B-2 force below its requirement of 19 aircraft by 2027.

B-2 Developments

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The B-2 is capable of participating in nuclear or conventional warfare either from its main operating base at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, or from a forward operating location outside the continental United States. Three overseas bases have been selected by the Air Force for forward deployment of the B-2: Royal Air Force Fairford in the United Kingdom; Andersen AFB, Guam; and Diego Garcia. Besides these, the Air Force is looking at one other forward operating location - a Middle East location that the Air Force will not identify publicly but which Gen. Michael Ryan, the Air Force chief of staff, said "we're looking at" for what he termed "other capabilities."

New mission requirements in Fiscal Year 2003 include supporting the Air Force’s Global Strike Task Force by building B-2 aircraft hangars at Royal Air Force Fairford, United Kingdom, and B-2 aircraft parking pads at Diego Garcia. The Air Force decided it was unrealistic to deploy the B-2 without shelters, as planned, because some low-observable materials are not as durable as expected and require lengthy maintenance, some in an environmentally controlled shelter after each flight. In addition, B-2s must be kept in shelters because of their sensitivity to moisture, water, and other severe climatic conditions. Air Force operational requirements for the B-2 intended for both the interim and fully capable B-2s to be capable of deploying to forward operating locations, without shelters, in all types of weather and climates. During operational testing of the interim configuration, low-observable materials took from 30 to 80 hours to repair and cure, and the processes require a shelter with a temperature and humidity controlled environment for proper curing. Testing indicated that B-2s are also sensitive to extreme climates, water, and humidity-- exposure to water or moisture can damage some of the low-observable enhancing surfaces on the aircraft. Therefore, if B-2s are to be deployed, some form of aircraft sheltering at a forward operating location is a requirement.

On September 28, 2001 the Pentagon awarded a $12 million contract to build four specially designed shelters to protect the aircraft under the B-2 Extra Large Shelter Program. This contract includes four deployable, extra-large shelter systems, four sets of anchoring kits, 12 air-conditioners, four humidifiers, two extra-large shelter deployment kits, two environmental control system deployment kits, one humidifier deployment kit, two spares/tool kits and two erection towers. At this time, the total amount of funds has been obligated. This work will be completed 30 weeks after receipt of order.

One shelter would be erected at Fairford and four would go to Diego Garcia. Five more shelters are needed, because Andersen already has hangars the B-2 could use. The shelters measure 125 feet wide, 250 feet long and 55 feet high, and can withstand winds of 110 mph and 40 pounds of snow per square foot. The portable hangars, which are basically aluminum trusses covered with two layers of vinyl-coated fabric, are designed to protect the billion-dollar B-2 stealth bombers from harsh weather and gale winds. The hangars can be taken apart for shipping by boat or plane, and provide more lighting, space and environmental controls than the existing permanent air force docks.

Initial plans focused on erecting temporary shelters on the Indian Ocean island for the aircraft. But it was later determined more permanent structures are needed to house the sophisticated planes. Britain gave its go-ahead to start construction in July 2002. Officials said the work will take some time.

Two B-2 bombers departed Guam 02 April 1998 after successfully completing their first deployment to a forward operating location. During their 10-day stay at Andersen AFB, men and women of the 509th Bomb Wing from Whiteman AFB, Mo., along with two B-2s, tested every aspect of what it takes to operate and maintain the bombers away from their home station. Just months after receiving the first jets in their final Block 30 configuration, the 509th BW validated the new dimension of being able to fight from a forward location to its combat capability. Because the hangars at Andersen AFB suffered severe damage in super typhoon Paca, at least one of the bombers sat in the open at all times, alternately being baked under the hot sun and being drenched by the driving rain storms of the South Pacific. Most all maintenance, including that of low-observable coatings, was performed outdoors. The tropical weather had little, if any, effect on the maintenance and operations of the aircraft. The bombers achieved 100 percent sortie success rate, accumulating nearly 90 flying hours prior to returning to the States.

On 06 August 1998 the 509th Bomb Wing commander temporarily suspended peacetime training missions for the B-2 Spirit. This temporary suspension did not impact the 509th Bomb Wing's combat capability. The suspension was the result of a potential problem associated with initiators which operate the air crew ejection system. The manufacturer discovered the potential flaw in the initiators during routine acceptance testing. Each B-2 has eight initiators and all initiators will be replaced as a safety precaution. Each aircraft resumed peacetime training as soon as replacement parts were installed and inspections were complete. B-2 Bombers resumed normal flying operations on 10 August 1998.

The B-2 stealth bomber made its operational debut 24 March 1999 when two Spirits dropped 32 2,000-pound joint direct-attack munitions during a 31-hour, nonstop mission from Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. The B-2 was the only operational aircraft used to deliver JDAMs. The combination of its all-weather precision capability and the B-2’s ability to penetrate lethal defenses put high-value fixed targets at risk. Over the course of Operation Allied Force, 45 B-2 sorties by a total of six aircraft delivered 656 JDAMs on critical targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Extensive tanker support was needed to refuel B-2s flying global attack sorties. Each plane had to be refueled multiple times during its sortie. While such capability is essential for rapid employment in any scenario, forward basing would substantially reduce tanker requirements, reduce sortie length (simplifying everything from mission preparation to crew fatigue), and allow these assets to be utilized at a greater rate. Forward basing remains the optimum employment scheme for all long-range platforms.

In June 2000 more than 90 members of the 509th Bomb Wing deployed to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, on a 12-day global power mission for the B-2. The operation was called Coronet Spider. While at Andersen, the 509ers will become the 325th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron to practice flying operations from a forward operating location and test new capabilities for the stealth aircraft. The EBS was named the 325th because it was primarily made of members from the 325th Bomb Squadron. The rest of the expeditionary force was made up of airmen from the 509th Security Forces Squadron, 393rd BS, 509th Operations Support Squadron and various members of the wing. The mission plan included 14 sorties, eight of which were flown from the forward operating location in Guam. The expeditionary squadron had only three B-2s for the 14 sorties. The eight missions that were flown on location lasted an average of 10 hours. These 10-hour sorties from Guam would probably be 40- to 45-hour sorties if flown from Whiteman AFB.

With the number of overseas bases shrinking, it is likely that future combat missions will takeoff from Whiteman, strike targets, and either land back at Whiteman or at another base. During Kosovo the B-2 averaged 30-hour missions and at that time the furthest commanders felt comfortable pushing pilots was to a 40-hour sortie. In May 2001 four pilots conducted the longest B-2 simulator mission in history - a 50-hour flight in the B-2 Weapon System Trainer. The simulator mission was based on real-world targets and threats. The pilots flew from Whiteman, in-flight refueled six times, struck targets and landed at an overseas base. Crews could not leave the simulator once it started. Everything the pilots needed for a real mission had to be in the WST with them. Helmets, ejection seat harnesses, maps, food, water and sleeping bags had to be packed into the cramped 10-foot by 10-foot full-motion B-2 cockpit simulator. A chaise lounge chair for sleeping and a small dry chemical toilet, similar to those used for camping, were also used.

During Operation Enduring Freedom the B-2 flew a total of six missions on the first three days of the war. Each sortie took 70 hours, including the flight to Afghanistan, a turn-around at Diego Garcia for a new crew, and the flight back to Whiteman. Of the 21 B-2s, a total of 55 percent were mission-capable when the bombing began on 07 October 2001, though by November 2001 the mission-cable rate fell to 49 percent.

The Air Force goal is to have aircraft available for combat 60 percent of the time. Much of the B-2 maintenance time is devoted to removing blemishes from its radar-absorbing skin. The B-2 fleet was available for combat duty 31 percent of the time during 2001, down from 37 percent the previous year. As of June 2002, the 21 B-2s had only a 42 percent mission-capable rate, meaning just eight or so planes were ready to perform at least one of their assigned operational missions. Inability to meet stealth requirements is the single greatest driver for the low B-2 readiness rates. The aircraft's composite skin needs time-consuming repairs before it can meet standards. Were low-observability requirements not a factor, the plane would remain relatively ready, boasting a rate closer to 80 percent mission-capable.

The Air Force is undertaking a B-2 "mission-capable rate improvement plan," crafted by Northrop Grumman. This will replace the traditional tape and caulking material repair method with a new approach using spray-on, radar-absorbing coating. Thought the new method promises to save time and money, the plan is to introduce it slowly over a period of seven years as B-2s cycle through depot.

Air Vehicle	Aircraft #	*Name []**	Ordered	Delivered to USAF	Arrived Whiteman
AV- 1	82-1066	Spirit of AMERICA Fatal Beauty	n/a	17 Jul 89	14 Jul 2000
AV- 2	82-1067	Spirit of ARIZONA Ship From Hell [Murphy's Law]	n/a	19 Oct 90	20 Mar 98
AV- 3	82-1068	Spirit of NEW YORK Navigator / Ghost [Afternoon Delight]	n/a	18 Jun 91	10 Oct 97
AV- 4	82-1069	Spirit of INDIANA Christine	n/a	02 Oct 92	22 May 99
AV- 5	82-1070	Spirit of OHIO Fire and Ice [Toad]	n/a	05 Oct 92	18 Jul 97
AV- 6 TOV&V	82-1071	Spirit of MISSISSIPPI Black Widow / Penguin [Arnold the Pig]	n/a	02 Feb 93	23 May 98
AV- 7	88-0328	Spirit of TEXAS Pirate Ship	1987	29 Aug 94	31 Aug 94
AV- 8	88-0329	Spirit of MISSOURI	1987	11 Dec 93	17 Dec 93
AV- 9	88-0330	Spirit of CALIFORNIA	1988	16 Aug 94	17 Aug 94
AV-10	88-0331	Spirit of S. CAROLINA	1988	29 Dec 94	30 Dec 94
AV-11	88-0332	Spirit of WASHINGTON	1989	27 Oct 94	30 Oct 94
AV-12	89-0127	Spirit of KANSAS	1989	16 Feb 95	17 Feb 95
AV-13	89-0128	Spirit of NEBRASKA	1990	26 Jun 95	28 Jun 95
AV-14	89-0129	Spirit of GEORGIA	1990	25 Sep 95	14 Nov 95
AV-15	90-0040	Spirit of ALASKA	1991	12 Jan 95	24 Jan 96
AV-16	90-0041	Spirit of HAWAII	1991	21 Dec 95	10 Jan 96
AV-17	92-0700	Spirit of FLORIDA	1992	29 Mar 96	3 Jul 96
AV-18	93-1085	Spirit of OKLAHOMA	1993	13 May 96	15 May 96
AV-19	93-1086	Spirit of KITTY HAWK	1993		30 Aug 96
AV-20	93-1087	Spirit of PENNSYLVANIA	1993		05 Aug 97
AV-21	93-1088	Spirit of LOUISIANA	1993		10 Nov 97
AV-22-76			Cancelled
AV-77-133			Cancelled
AV-134-165			Cancelled