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The F-94 "Starfire"

The roots of development for the F-94 lay in the WW II P-80 Shooting Star, USAF's first truly operational jet fighter. Specifically, however, the F-94 interceptor stemmed from Lockheed's successful conversion of the basic P-80 into a two-seat trainer. This TF-80c, first flown in March 1948, became the T-33 in mid-1944. The F-94 was born the same year.

The GOR called for the extra punch of an all-weather jet interceptor. Early availability took precedence over it capability to counter any threat beyond that of the TU-4(Russian equivalent to the B-29).

One week after re-endorsing continued development of the Northrop F-89, the Air Force directed production of the two-place, radar-equipped F-80 (christened F-94 in 1949. Two major factors prompted the decision. The North American F-82 (the only "all-weather interceptor" available) was highly unsatisfactory. More over, operation integration of its replacement would probably be delayed, since the F-89 was an entirely new design. North American never built any interceptor-type F-82s. But the two-engine, twin-fuselage, low-wing, long-range escort fighter could be converted into a single-place interceptor by removing the controls and canopy from the right-hand cockpit. The F-82Fs, -Gs, and -Hs, officially classified as fighter-interceptors, were two-seaters with a radar operator in place of the copilot. These F-82s actually could not cope with nad weather. Even as night fighters, their performance was becoming obsolete.

Secretary of Defenze Forrestal's approval of the future interim F-94 in November 1948, followed by President Truman's release of funds, led to a January letter contract with Lockheed. This LC was replaced a few months later by a definitive contract (AF-1849) covering 150 F-94 productions (later reduced to 109).

The first flight of the aircraft was made on 16 April 1949 by a radar equipped TF-80. By on of two T-33A trainers (improved, redesignated TF-80Cs), modified modified for the interceptor role by adding radar noses and rear fuselage afterburners. Lockheed used the converted T-33s as F-94 prototypes to speed development, but both were little more than TF-SOCs. In effect, production aircraft flight-tested before the end of 1949 comprised 75 percent standard P-80C parts. Like the F80/T-33 Shooting Stars, the Starfire's first model (F-94A) had wing tip drop tanks. Advertising the Starftre's last model (F-94C) in later years, Lockheed praised it as "an engineering achievement of creating a more advanced model out of an existing airplane.” By then, however, the Air Force generally believed this was the aircraft's foremost shortcoming.

The F-94 program changed twice in less than a year. Despite reduction of the Air Force's size, procurement quickly rose to 288-almost double the quantity sought in January 1949. The August detonation of an atom bomb in Russia forced another evaluation of Air Force planning. The F-94 procurement was raised again in December (to 368 aircraft) because "foreign possession of the atomic bomb necessitates acceleration of the USAF program to modernize its interceptor and all-weather force at the earliest possible time." Growing F-94 importance brought renewed, concerted efforts to improve the aircraft's overall performance. Lockheed proposed and the Air Force bought the F -97A, a drastically redesigned F-94. When technical hindrances immediately arose, the Air Force had to endorse still another, but far less ambitious, F-94 configuration. This became the F-94B, while the F-97A ended up as the F-94C.

F-94As began reaching air defense units about 6 months behind schedule. These makeshift interceptors were received at McChord and Moses Lake, Wash., by the 325th Fighter Wing of the Continental Air Command. CONAC, formed on 1 December 1948, included the Air Defense Command, the Tactical Air Command, and nine fighter squadrons formerly assigned to the Strategic Air Command. The rationale for CONAC (under economy programs of the pre-Korean years) was to train all fighter units for both tactical and air defense action. This would make many more aircraft available for all missions.

By the end of the year, CONAC's operational inventory counted 60 of the new F-94A. The F-94A's Allison J-33 engine, slated for the F-94B, did not work well. Despite improvement, it still suffered from turbine blade failures 2 years after the first F -94A had become operational. Also, the F-94's fuel system was far from perfect; the aircraft was unstable and hard to maneuver at high altitude. Moreover, the cockpits were too small. The pilot and radar operator found it impossible to get in and out quickly during alerts and scrambles. They had to fly in a cramped position. Even more vital, the clearance for seat ejection was slight.

The Air Force got Lockheed to correct the ejection seats and cockpits of 330 F-94 (A and B) aircraft for some $4.5 million. Minor improvements, already scheduled by the Air Force, would be done concurrently with the Lockheed modification. Excluding the coat of ordnance and government-furnished aeronautical equipment (GFAE).

All 109 F-94As were accepted by the Air Force between December 1949 and December 1950-14 in FY 50, and 95 in FY 51. Cost per aircraft was: 258,123.00-airframe, $193,721; engine (installed), $45,227; electronic, $4,014; armament, $15,161.

A few ANG squadrons, federalized during the Korean War, flew F-94s in late 1951. Upon reverting to inactive status, their planes stayed with active Air Defense Command units. Nonetheless, no F-94As remained in the USAF inventory in mid-1954. ADC was established on 21 March 1948. It lost its major air command status and became an operational command under CONAC in December 1948, but reemerged as a major air command on 1 January 1951.

 

The F-94 B "Starfire"

The F-97A (redesignated F-94C) was ordered right after the F-94A. The third model followed the F-94A in production and became the F-94B. New features of the F-94B included, gyroscopic instrument (Sperry Zero Reader) for more accurate landings in bad weather; high pressure oxygen system; improved hydraulic system; and larger, better-shaped, external fuel tanks. These were mounted along the airplane's center line instead of being suspended from the wings, as on the F-94A.

A converted F-94A, the 19th production, flew the maiden flight in December 1950. F-94Bs began reaching the operational forces a few months later. Despite its new features, the F-94B closely resembled the F-94A. The two had similar engines and cockpits, the same configuration weaknesses, and deficient fuel systems. Thus, they shared identical operational problems and required like postproduction modifications. Lacking adequate anti-icing equipment, neither the F-94A nor F 94B could qualify as an all-weather interceptor. The B's windshield-but not the A's-did have some kind of anti-icing system. Pending something better, ADC welcomed the B.

A handful of F-94Bs soon joined the 15 F-94As allocated to the Far East Air Forces in March 1951. The aircraft were so few, however, that they could not be easily spared. Hence, they did not enter the Korean war until late December 1951, when the 68th FIS posted two F -94s on strip alert at Suwon Air Base. The Air Force hurried the conversion of FEAF's old F-82s to more modern F-94Bs. In addition, it deployed the 319th FIS to Korea.. This unit's F-94Bs went into operation at Suwon on 22 March 1952. Even then the aircraft's involvement was limited to local air defense scrambles under positive ground-radar control. The new F-94s were fitted with the latest fire-control system. to Produced by the Hughes Aircraft Company, the E-1 was the first in the E series of sophisticated fire-control systems that were to equip more modern planes. The Air Force ordered the system in June 1948, when it asked that the AN/AP" radar (being developed for the tail defense of the B-36) be adapted to the Northrop F-89. A November amendment of the June contract extended the requirement to the F-94. The modified AN/APG-3 radar was redesignated AN/ APG-33 and the entire system, including its A-1C gunsight, became the E-1 in late 1949. It was installed in early F-89s as well as F-94As and -Bs. Low powered, the E-1 was fairly primitive alongside the E-5 of the rocket-firing F 94C. The system was nevertheless a pioneer achievement. The Air Force, therefore, did not want them to fly over enemy territory where this secret electronic equipment could be compromised. The restriction was not lifted until nearly a year later-after continued B 29 losses were tied to the ineffectiveness of fighter-escorts equipped with the older airborne-intercept radars. The 319th FIS in November 1952 began using some of its F 94Bs as a screen between the Yalu and Chongehon rivers. Soon after, F -94s also flew within a 30-mile radius of the B-29 targets. Enemy planes usually retreated rather than come up against F-94 barrier patrols.

Although not too successful against low-flying aircraft, few planes proved as reliable as the F -W against the enemy in the Korean war, even in nasty weather and darkness. Besides B 29 escort duties and enemy fighter interception missions, F --94s protected B-26 light bombers and could fly deep into North Korea when most other aircraft were grounded due to bad weather. Korean veterans as a rule praised the F-94. It was rugged and could fly many hours without maintenance.

The Air Force lost 28 F-94s between January 1952 and 27 July 1953-the day the war ended. Only one of the 28 losses was due to direct enemy action. During the same period, F-94 pilots claimed four enemy planes destroyed. The Air Force accepted 356 F-94Bs, 176 F-94Bs in FY 51 and 180 in FY 52-the last four in January 1952. Cost per aircraft was: $196,248.00-airframe, $123,422; engine (installed, $31,336; electronics, $7,635; ordnance, $2,947; armament, $30,908.

The F-94B, like the F-94A, left the active force by mid-1954. The Guard still flew the two models in late 1957. Milestones included using the E-1 fire-control system, the F 94 made its first Korean kill at night, destroying a conventional, but speedy LA-9. The Starfire pilot (Capt. Ben L. Fithian) and observer (Lt. Sam R. Lyons) never saw the enemy plane until it burst into flames. F -94s shot down three other elusive enemy jets before the armistice.

 

The F-94 A / F-94C

New feature included, Pratt & Whitney J48-P-5 or -5A engine (8,300-1b thrust with afterburner; 6,250-1b, without); thinner wings, with increased dihedral; sweptback horizontal stabilizer; aft dive flaps, drag chute; and longer nose with radome in retractable shield. Allrocket armament accommodated 48 2.75-inch folding-fin aerial rockets 24 in a ring of firing tubes around the nose and 24 in two cylindrical pods. One pod was located on each of the two wings, midway between root and tip. Alsb featured were wing and horizontal stabilizer thermal de-icing, single-point refueling, greater fuel capacity, as well as the Hughes E-5 fire-control system and Westinghouse W-3A autopilot (for, instrument approach).

The prototype flight took place 11 months before the Yk'-9413's first official flight. Converted F-94A.s were used in each case. The entire F-94 program finally totaled 862 productions--109 F-94As (against a fret order for 160), 856 F-84Bs, and 387 F-94Cs (originally known as F-97As). Air Force records, however, showed only 2 prototypes (1 YF-94B and 1 YF-94C) officially accepted-others were accounted for as production aircraft, or charged to another program (as were the P-94A prototypes, developed from F-80C and T-33 productions).

The USAF decision for a redesigned F-94 (referred to as the F 97A) followed reappraisal of the F-94 program and January 1950 plans calling for haste in supplying the air defense forces with better and more of the Lockheed interim interceptors. The Air Force realized a drastically improved P-94A was not there for the asking. It then settled for a third, but "in-between type," that preceded the so-called F-97A-the F-94B, which still fell short of the Air Force's early 1960 expectations.

The F -97A, endorsed by the Air Force in February 1950, formally became the F-94C--third, biggest, and last of the F-94 model series as well as the final upshot of the basic Shooting Star design.

The F-94C ran immediately into trouble. To begin with, the first production deliveries were scheduled for 1951--far too early. Both the Pratt & Whitney J-48 engine and laminar wings specifically earmarked for the F-94C, were not likely to be fully developed when needed. Other improvements or new components (many also intended for the F-94B) were slipping. The automatic approach system was not ready; testing of the 250-kilowatt-radar, rocket nose, and collision-course sight was not due until 1951; development of an advanced fuel purging system showed scant progress, and the only autopilot available was too big even for the larger F-94C.

Although this plane was not accepted by the Air Force until May 1952, it did not go directly to the operational forces.

The Air Force allocated to the testing program the F -94C proto type (first flown as the YF-97A in January 1950 and accepted in October), together with 9 other aircraft received by the end of June 1962. None of these "test productions" performed well. ADC concluded that low speed (some 40 knots less than the F-89) and poor maneuverability downgraded the F-94C. Nevertheless, it would be acceptable if these deficiencies were corrected. Some of them-the unsatisfactory fuel system in particular-were reported by test pilots of the Air. Research and Development Center (ARDC) as resulting from poor design and substandard quality control during production. Others reflected a variety of causes that combined to erode the plane's efficiency.

On its first trial in August 1951, the F-94C's J48-P-5 engine had passed its 150-hour qualification test, but its afterburner had warped and cracked. After much testing and redesign, the engine finally passed new qualification tests in May 1952 with afterburner intact. Fuel burner nozzle failures occurred soon afterward. Since it was impossible to find defective nozzles by visual inspection, the F-94Cs were grounded. Fitting all engines with improved nozzles solved the problem before the end of 1952. Despite fairly good engine performance after some modifications, the Air Force in mid-1962 still sought to enhance the rate of climb and high-altitude reliability of the P-5. It considered switching to the higher thrust J48-P8, but installation difficulties wiped out the project.

A joint study (Headquarters USAF, Air Proving Ground Command (APGC), ARDC, and ADC) called for variable position dive brakes, aileron spoilers, a better drag chute, and further improve ment of the engine reliability. The study also recommended speedy installation of the aircraft's new rocket armament (early F 94Cs still carried machineguns) and additional rockets.

By mid-October 1952, the F-94C's flight characteristics and controls were improved. More than $3.5 million had been allotted to modify the cockpits of early F-94Cs (Some 260 F-94Cs would probably feature the F-94A and F-94B small cockpits and the Air Force did not expect $3.5 million to fill the bill. ), and work was underway to correct the aircraft's inadequate de-icing boots and faulty stall warnings. Lockheed had also arranged for field installation of the variable position dive brakes and aileron spoilers. Drag chute improvements were progressing and ways to upgrade the engine's reliability were under review. Armament difficulties, however, remained unsolved.

The success of the F-94C's all-rocket armament hinged on rocket accuracy and interceptor performance reliability. .The F-94C and its rockets had neither. The F-94C's all-rocket armament had been a key selling point. Admittedly, a salvo of rockets would cause more damage than a burst of machinegun fire. Worse, the P-5 engine flamed out when the full-nose load of 24 rockets was salvoed above 26,000 feet. If only 12 rockets were fired, a near flameout still occurred that slowed the interceptor speed. The Air force wanted the problems cured and the rocket load doubled. Both could be done. In fact, the mounting of additional rockets in wing pods had been considered since 1951. Nonetheless, it was unlikely the F -94C would get its extra rockets before the 163d production.

Improvements notwithstanding, two of the four production con tracts (the first, definitive on 27 July 1950, dealt with the F-97A) were cancelled late in the year, cutting F-94C procurement from 617 to 387. The Air Force considered canceling the entire program in July. It held off because of anything better and the need (in the midst of the Korean War) to keep Lockheed in production.

In the spring (beginning with the 100th production-not the 163d), F-94Cs came off the assembly line with wing pod "side arms:' Each pod packed 12 of the Aeromite-developed FFARs. The long cylinder pods measured 9 feet 6 inches and their fiber glass nose covers protruded about 6 feet from the wing leading edge. Before the rockets left the pods, the fiberglass covers disintegrated due to rocket-generated gas pressure. The production-improved F-94Cs also came with new ejection seats that would lift both the pilot and radar observer well above the cockpit sill.

With ADC's 437th FIS at Otis AFB. As the first rocket-bearing interceptor, the F-94C generated less enthusiasm than expected. Maintenance crews praised the F-94C, because they could get to its electronics equipment easily. Pilots generally liked the aircraft, commenting that the J48P-6 engine "wheezed, coughed, spurted, and burped at altitude; but it never quit running." Nearly 2 years behind schedule, it showed limited performance. And, clearly, its basic design could not be stretched further to meet future needs. Intended as a "quick-fix" all-weather interceptor to fill the air defense gap until the F-89 was ready, 1949 planning had envisioned an operational F-94C in 1951. Moreover, the F-94C (like the F-94A and B) could not destroy any bomber superior to the Russian TU-4 that compared with the B-29.

The 437th FIS attained initial operational capability in June.

In mid-1954, squadron operational suitability tests confirmed the F-94C's poor weather-proofing and disclosed leaky fuel tanks. They also revealed the need to improve the E-5 fire-control system. During continuing rain in late 1863, 80 percent of the alert aircraft at one base went out of commission. Moisture in the cockpit had short-cixgluited the electrical and fire-control systems.

Known as Hop-Up, these modifications resolved the F 94C's recently confirmed shortcomings. Early F-94Cs also exchanged their ejection seats for the safer ones featured by later productions. The Hop-Up modification of the E-5 eventually added an optical sight to the system.

The Air Force took delivery of 9 F-94Cs in FY 52, 153 in FY 53, and 225 in FY 54. The YF-94C had been accepted in October 1951. Cost per aircraft was: $534,073.00-airframe, $380,755; engine (installed), $90;147; electronics, $7,058; ordnance, $518; armament, $55;595.

F-94D: A single-seat fighter-bomber for long-range ground sup port. The D would have a high-thrust centrifugal flow turbojet engine with afterburner, plus autopilot and airborne equipment to allow automatic approach and tactical control from the ground. Authorized for procurement in mid-1951 (when the Korean War started), one F -94D prototype was developed (through conversion of an early F-94 production), but the 112 F-94Ds on order were all cancelled.

Despite mediocre performance, the F-94C lasted a long time as a first-line interceptor. The Air Force wanted to get rid of the aircraft, but could ill afford it. The P-94C in mid-1954 (when ADC counted a peak 265) was still regarded as the best two-man interceptor at low altitudes. Despite many structural modifications, the F-89 operated. poorly, particularly at low level; and the Convair F-102 (originally due to enter service in mid-1963) was several years away. As for the development of a low-altitude surface to-air missile (investigated under Project LASAM), this was out of the question insofar as the Air Force was concerned. It planned instead to test low-altitude seekers that ADC could possibly use on its future Bombers. At one time during 1955, 48 percent of the Air Force's remaining F-94Cs were grounded for lack of parts. The F-94C finally. disappeared from USAF rolls in early 1959; from the ANG's in mid

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